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What do we know about whether performance-related pay schemes work to improve performance in the
public sector? Beth Foley, Tiffany Tsang and Kathryn Ray review the evidence and urge caution,
finding that such schemes are far more complex than they first appear, the evidence is frequently
inconsistent, and that much depends on the design and context of the scheme.
George Osborne’s announcement in last year’s spending review that reforms to progression pay to
“ensure that public sector workers do not receive pay increases purely as a result of time in post”
represented a further step in an ongoing trend. Performance-Related Pay (PRP) schemes — pay
systems in which some component of remuneration is based on performance — has long been an
important idea for economists and managers alike. Under the simplest logic, PRP aims to
strengthen the link between rewards and the productivity of employees, motivating individuals to
work harder to ultimately improve outcomes.
But what do we know about whether PRP schemes work to improve performance in the public
sector? Forms of PRP began to be introduced into the UK public sector in the 1990s and as this
process accelerates today, our evidence review for the Office of Manpower Economics examines
the evidence base on PRP schemes in the public sector.
In the public sector, as in the private sector, there is evidence that PRP can lead to improvements in
those outcomes that are directly incentivised. In education, this can mean increases in student test
scores; in health, it can mean providers delivering improvements in care quality. Yet, despite these
positive impacts, our findings suggest a need for caution when applying PRP schemes to the public
sector. Not only is the evidence inconsistent – with much dependent upon organisational and
occupational context and scheme design and implementation – positive effects are often small and
sometimes short-lived and cost effectiveness data is rare. Moreover, a number of challenges and unintended
consequences have been found, highlighting the complexity of public sector PRP:
1) Misallocation of effort occurs when PRP encourages employees to work to incentivised tasks at the expense of
others – which may be equally desirable but not incentivised, often because they are not easy to measure. This is a
significant problem in public services due to the complexity of desired outcomes, some of which may also only be
visible in the long-term. This raises questions about the feasibility of meaningful performance measures within public
sector PRP. For example, in education, PRP schemes have raised student test scores, but have had contradictory
effects on co-operative and collegial behaviour among teachers, suggesting that PRP encourages teachers to ‘teach
to the test’ and focus on ‘borderline’ pupils.  Misallocation of effort may be minimised by devising schemes with a
broader suite of targets to reflect a fuller range of outcomes, but there are trade offs because schemes become
complex and costly to administer and monitor. An example is the QOF in UK primary care, which has a range of
targets across different domains of care, but is costly to administer with modest positive impacts.
2) Collaborative activity: The delivery of public services tends to be a complex and collaborative activity, which
makes attributing individual responsibility for performance and outcomes difficult. There is a risk that PRP schemes
can act as a disincentive to teamwork, and if distribution of rewards is viewed as unfair, demotivation can occur,
leading to a possible decline in performance. Such outcomes may also depend on employee characteristics, for
example in education, male teachers are more likely to support PRP and respond to it positively than their female
counterparts – which has wider implications for the acceptance and success of PRP in the female-dominated public
services.
On the other hand, PRP schemes can result in improvements in team relations and work organisation. Trials of
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team performance targets in the UK civil service have seen productivity improvements as a result of managers
redistributing tasks among team members more efficiently. Indeed it has been suggested that PRP schemes may
operate via the introduction of better management practice. Designing PRP systems in consultation with staff,
allowing input on the goals and targets that they consider to be most important, is one way of overcoming perceived
unfairness in PRP systems, and there is some evidence that collaborative PRP schemes are more likely to be
effective than others.
3) Questions of motivation: PRP’s focus on financial reward alone risks neglecting the wider range of factors that
motivate employees, including peer effects, management practices, perceptions of fairness and intrinsic motivation.
The latter is particularly significant in the public sector, where many staff derive motivation from belief in the intrinsic
value of their services. Evidence on whether PRP ‘crowds out’ intrinsic motivation, ultimately resulting in poorer
performance, is inconclusive and partly depends on the extent to which performance targets align with professionals’
own goals. Nonetheless, other ways of motivating performance may utilise intrinsic motivations more effectively
than financial rewards; thus more research is needed on the relative cost-effectiveness of these different
performance improvement strategies.
4) Scheme design: Finally, it is important to be aware in designing and implementing PRP that different ways of
measuring and rewarding performance have different effects on behaviour.  For example, relative measures are
more likely to stimulate improvement among poorer performers, while threshold measures stimulate improvement
among the middle range. Measures that rely on manager subjectivity in performance assessment can also result in
perceived unfairness, leading to diminished effort and motivation. Ensuring targets align with overall improvement
goals, employing a balance between objective and subjective performance measures, and involving employees in
discussions about the most appropriate metrics are ways of addressing these issues.
So, what does the future hold for PRP in the public sector? Our review suggests that such policies are far more
complex than they first appear, that evidence is frequently inconsistent and that much depends on the design and
context of the scheme. Full consideration of alternative means of performance improvement, such as developing
good management practice, is also vital when weighing up the costs and benefits of public sector PRP.
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